I share Eliot’s point of departure on the events of late last week – the Houthi seizure of the port of Mocha, Perim and the Hanish islands and the apparent intent to control the Bal el-Mandeb as well as the Iraqi Shia militias’ attack on the Saudi East-West pipeline that was subsequently shut down due to the damage. These actions were clearly part of the larger Iranian strategy of activating its regional proxies, opening a second front, and helping it press its advantages in its effort to secure control of the Strait of Hormuz. But developments over the weekend lead me to a somewhat different conclusion and set up what I hope will be a lively conversation on this week’s show.
Rather than impelling the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to form a coalition of the willing to undue the Houthi gains on the battlefield as Eliot sketches out in his take (which I am ready to concede remains an option and a possibility), I see this as reinforcing something we have already seen in Saudi behavior throughout this conflict: hedging its response with outreach (and potential bribery) of adversaries.
Developments of note are that the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has reached out twice to President Trump asking for the US to intercede (whether with air strikes or intelligence seems a bit hazy) but has been turned down. The President has commented several times on the situation and said that despite his refusal to come to the aid of the Saudis militarily that everything will “work out fine and dandy” and added that the Houthis have reached out to the US and indicated that they have no interest in resuming the conflict between the two that took place in 2025.